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Abstract
Multinationals’ mode of foreign expansion may depend on whether or not they expect
technological externalities or spillovers to generate new competition. Existing models
where ex-post spillovers aﬀect the ex-ante entry choice usually study the choice between
exporting and FDI with horizontal spillovers. I consider a monopoly firm with a vertical
production structure that has four possible modes of entry, one of which includes out-
sourcing of intermediate input production to a host county firm. Technological spillovers
in this model are vertical, generating threat of entry of a new intermediate input pro-
ducer. When outsourcing contracts are incomplete, vertical spillovers that generate threat
of entry upstream do not necessarily benefit the multinational in the downstream market.
Keywords: Multinational firms, Vertical spillovers, Outsourcing, Incomplete contracts, Mode of entry
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1. Introduction
Multinationals’ mode of entry into a new market may depend on whether or not
they expect technological externalities or spillovers to generate new competition.
Existing models where mode of entry is aﬀected by spillovers, all consider hori-
zontal spillovers. Typically, when the multinational expects that spillovers may
generate new competition in its product market after establishing a subsidiary, it
may choose to enter the new market with exports rather than with foreign direct
investment (FDI).1 I investigate the eﬀect of vertical spillovers on a multinational’s
mode of foreign expansion. With vertical spillovers I mean spillovers of interme-
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diate input technology. The eﬀect such spillovers have in this paper is to generate
threat of entry in the intermediate input market.
Despite the documented increase in vertical fragmentation of production (e.g.
Hummels, Ishii and Yi 2001), theoretical work on vertical technology transfer
and vertical spillovers hardly exists. One exception is Pack and Saggi (2001),
who discuss vertical technology transfer through outsourcing of intermediate input
production. They take the outsourcing decision as given and focus on how vertical
spillovers that generate threat of entry aﬀect profits, while I compare profits from
outsourcing with other modes of entry in order to illustrate how vertical spillovers
aﬀect a multinational’s mode of foreign expansion.
There is a large empirical literature looking for horizontal spillovers from FDI
in the form of productivity eﬀects in local firms. In a recent survey of this liter-
ature, Görg and Greenaway (2001) conclude that there is no strong evidence for
positive horizontal spillovers from foreign firms to host country firms.2 Smarzyn-
ska (2002) argues that since multinationals have incentives to limit spillovers of
their final good technology, horizontal spillovers should not be expected, but since
multinationals may benefit from more productive local suppliers, vertical knowl-
edge spillovers to suppliers may be more likely than horizontal spillovers (see also
Moran 2001). Recent empirical studies looking for vertical spillovers through back-
ward linkages, tend to find evidence in support of such spillovers (see Blalock and
Gertler 2003, Jabbour and Mucchielli 2003 and Smarzynska 2002).
In order to study the eﬀect of vertical spillovers on multinationals’ mode of
entry choice, I construct a model where a multinational considers entering a new
market where it has monopoly power for its final good. The multinational controls
the technology for producing both the final good and an intermediate input. It
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produces both the input and the final good in its home plant. Given this vertical
production structure, I consider four diﬀerent modes of entry: 1) exporting, 2)
subsidiary production of the final good with intermediate inputs imported to the
subsidiary from the home plant (I call this mode of entry vertical FDI), 3) sub-
sidiary production of both the final good and the intermediate in the subsidiary
(horizontal FDI), and 4) subsidiary production of the final good and outsourcing
of the input to a local supplier (outsourcing).
Both under horizontal FDI and outsourcing, the MNE must decide on how
much resources to use in order to transfer intermediate input technology. The
more resources used for technology transfer, the lower the unit costs of input
production, and the lower the costs of the firm that benefits from spillovers.
Following Pack and Saggi (2001), I assume that technology transferred to an
outsourcing partner can spill over to another local firm in the host country and
generate threat of entry of a new input supplier.While Pack and Saggi assume
the final good producer and the intermediate input producer to interact in a bi-
lateral monopoly, I assume that outsourcing is governed by incomplete contracts.
Ottaviano and Turrini (2002) also discuss mode of entry choice with incomplete
outsourcing contracts as one possible mode of entry. The main diﬀerence to Otta-
viano and Turrini’s model is that I introduce the possibility of vertical spillovers
under outsourcing.
The incomplete contracting framework is based on recent work on outsourcing
versus internal production by Grossman and Helpman (2002). The basic justi-
fication for incomplete outsourcing contracts is that the quality of intermediate
inputs, though observable by the parties to the contract, cannot be verified by
a third party. Nonverifiable quality implies noncontractible quality, which again
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implies that an ex-ante contract which only specifies a price and a quantity of the
input is impossible. The multinational will not sign a contract which only specifies
a price and a quantity of the input, since the supplier would have incentives to
shirk on quality to cut costs. The result of contractual incompleteness is that the
multinational and the supplier have to resort to bargaining after the inputs are
produced. With no alternative buyer of the inputs, the supplier has a weak bar-
gaining position because it faces potential hold-up from the final good producer.
The result is that the supplier has insuﬃcient incentives to produce the optimal
quantity of inputs. The technology transfer decision is also negatively aﬀected by
the incomplete contracting environment. But wheras the supplier has no alterna-
tive buyer for its inputs and thus has no outside option in the negotiations, the
multinational can import inputs to its subsidiary from the home plant.
If the knowledge of how to produce the intermediate input spreads to another
local firm, the multinational can get inputs from the new supplier. This threat
of upstream entry has diﬀerent eﬀects in an outsourcing relationship governed by
bilateral monopoly as in Pack and Saggi (2001) and in the incomplete contratcing
framework considered here. In the Pack and Saggi model, the incumbent supplier
reacts to threat of entry by reducing its price to keep the potential entrant out of
the market. The result is of course beneficial for the multinational, while it hurts
the supplier. With incomplete outsourcing contracts threat of upstream entry has
the eﬀect of improving the outside option of the multinational. Though its profits
from outsourcing increase with the possibility of new suppliers, outsourcing will
in some cases not be a possible mode of entry for the multinational if local sup-
pliers are unwilling to enter an outsourcing relationship when they expect vertical
spillovers.
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The setting of the model is decribed in section 2, profits from the diﬀerent entry
modes are presented in section 3. Section 4 contains the mode of entry discussion,
while section 5 concludes.
2. The model
A multinational firm considers entering a new market M with its final product.
Market demand is given by
y = A/p2, (1)
where A is a measure of market size. Production of the final product requires
one unit of intermediate input per unit of final output, otherwise the assembly
process is costless. The input needed is specific for the final good and the firm
controls blueprints or patents for both stages of production. Our firm can choose
four diﬀerent modes of entry: exports, horizontal or vertical FDI, or outsourcing.
The firm can export the final product from its home plant to the new market.
Exports are subject to (iceberg) trade costs: when exporting y units of the final
good, only τE y units arrive to be sold in M, τE ∈ (0, 1). When τE is close
to one, trade costs are very low, while as τE approaches zero, trade costs become
prohibitive. The marginal and unit cost of producing the intermediate in the home
plant is 1.
Under the remaining modes of entry considered here, the MNE establishes a
subsidiary in M for assembly of the final product. Establishing the assembly plant
requires the firm to invest a fixed cost I. The three remaining modes of entry
diﬀer with respect to how the new assembly plant gets inputs.
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First, if the MNE chooses to import inputs from its home plant to the new
subsidiary, the mode of entry is called vertical FDI (V). Input trade is also subject
to trade costs, τV ∈ (0, 1), which may diﬀer from final good trade costs under
mode E. If trade costs for final goods are lower than for inputs, exporting will
dominate vertical FDI for all market sizes. When input trade costs are low, the
MNE will choose vertical FDI if the market is big enough to sustain the fixed costs
of establishing the assembly plant.
The two other ways of getting inputs are either by internal production in the
new plant (horizontal FDI (H)) or by outsourcing (O) to a local firm in M. Both
ways require technology transfer from the home base of the MNE. The unit costs
of producing inputs will be lower, while the costs of transfer are higher the better
technology the MNE transfers to its own subsidiary or to an outsourcing partner.
The best technology the MNE can transfer is the same technology as it has in its
home plant. I set this level of transfer to 1 (Ti = 1, i = H, O) and call this full
technology transfer. When Ti < 1 there is less than full technology transfer. The
MNE has a cost of T 2i to transfer Ti, and the resulting unit cost for the input
producer would be 1/Ti.
The trade-oﬀ between outsourcing and horizontal FDI involves comparing two
diﬀerent ineﬃciencies. Given the assumption of nonverifiable input quality, the
two firms have to bargain over how to share the surplus that could be generated
by exchange of the inputs after the inputs are produced. The supplier faces a risk
of being held up once the inputs are produced, and this reduces the incentives for
input production given the technology it has received from the multinational. The
multinational anticipates suboptimal input production, which reduces its incen-
tives for technology transfer.
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While outsourcing generates a hold-up problem, I assume that internal pro-
duction of both input and final good in a foreign country requires some extra
monitoring and governance that increase the unit costs of inputs produced inter-
nally. If, for a given level of technology transfer T, the outsourcing partner has
unit cost 1/T , the subsidiary of the MNE has unit cost 1/ (T τH), where τH ∈ [0, 1]
represents the cost disadvantage of conducting integrated production in a foreign
country. The unit cost of producing the input in the subsidiary is larger than in
the home plant if τH < 1. Without a cost disadvantage of internal production
(τH = 1), the MNE would never consider outsourcing under incomplete contracts.
To illustrate the eﬀect of incomplete outsourcing contracts, I also include out-
sourcing with complete contracts. The MNE’s mode of entry choice is clearly
aﬀected by whether outsourcing contracts are complete or incomplete.
Under outsourcing, the technology for input production may spread to other
firms in M and may enable a new supplier to produce the inputs needed by the
MNE. For simplicity, I assume that spillovers are perfect, a potential new supplier
will have the same unit costs as the incumbent supplier that received technology
transfer from the MNE. I assume that technological spillovers are only possible
in the case of outsourcing, and not when the MNE produces the inputs within
the subsidiary.3 One argument in support of this could be that the local firm is
likely to be more embedded in the local economy than the entering multinational,
and existing demand and supply links between the local firm and other firms are
likely channels for spillovers. Once a local firm has received technology transfer it
should have incentives to protect its technology from potential competitors. The
assumptions I have made imply that host country firms are less able to protect their
technology than foreign firms located in the same market. (Could host countries be
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under more pressure to protect the intellectual property of entering multinationals
than that of their own firms?) Even if the multinational might want vertical
spillovers from its own plant, it might still want to limit such spillovers if vertical
and horizontal spillovers cannot be separated when both production processes are
done in the same plant.
Appendix A illustrates the sequence of decisions under the diﬀerent modes of
entry.
3. Profits under diﬀerent modes of entry
3.1. Exports of final goods
The MNE decides how much of the final product to sell in M, taking account
of the fact that an amount y shipped from its home plant only serves the demand
τE y in M. The profit maximization problem is
max
y
ΠE = pτEy − y,
where market demand is given by equation (1). The result is that the MNE
produces and ships
y =
1
4
AτE,
and gets total profits (equal to operating profits)
ΠE =
1
4
AτE. (2)
3.2. Vertical FDI
After investing the fixed cost I to establish an assembly plant, the MNE decides
the amount of inputs to ship to its new plant. Due to transport costs, shipping
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x units of input will only serve τV x units of final demand. The MNE maximizes
operating profits of the new assembly plant
max
x
πV = pτV x− x.
This is the same decision problem as under the export mode, so operating profits
are
πV =
1
4
AτV , (3)
and total profits are
ΠV = πV − I. (4)
When transport costs for inputs are larger than for final goods (τV < τE), ex-
ports of the final good will always dominate vertical FDI; if there are no transport
costs to save by shipping inputs rather than final goods, it does not pay to invest
in an assembly plant in the new market.
3.3. Horizontal FDI
With horizontal FDI the MNE establishes both input production and final
good production in the new market. After sinking the fixed cost I to establish
the assembly plant, the MNE must decide on the level of technology transfer for
input production. Given the level of technology, the MNE makes its production
decision. The maximization problem is solved by backwards induction. First, for
a given technology level TH , maximize profits with respect to quantity produced.
Max
x
ΠH = px−
1
τHTH
x− T 2H .
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The resulting quantity depends on the technology level and the cost disadvantage
of internal production
x =
1
4
AT 2Hτ
2
H .
Second, find the optimal level of technology transfer by solving
Max
TH
ΠH =
√
Ax− 1
THτH
x− T 2H .
√
Ax is the total sales revenue px with the inverse of the demand function in (1)
substituded for p. The resulting level of technology transfer is
TH =



1
8AτH if A <
8
τH
1 if A ≥ 8τH .
(5)
From (5) we see that full technology transfer under horizontal FDI requires a
relatively large market and a small cost disadvantage of internal production (large
τH).
Total profits are
ΠH =



1
64A
2τ2H − I if A < 8τH
1
4AτH − 1− I if A ≥
8
τH
,
(6)
where the first line in (6) is the profit level with less than full technology transfer,
and the second line profits with full technology transfer.
3.4. Outsourcing with incomplete contracts
After establishing the assembly plant, the MNE transfers input technology to
a local supplier, and conducts only the assembly of the final good in its subsidiary.
With incomplete contracts the two firms bargain over how to share the surplus
from exchange of the inputs after technology transfer and input production have
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taken place. The surplus they can share is the revenue generated from sale of the
final good. Given the market demand in (1), surplus is
S =
√
Ax. (7)
Let the generalized Nash bargaining solution determine the outcome of the nego-
tiation:
Max
SS
N = [SS − FS ]β [S − SS − FMNE ](1−β),
where SS is the share going to the supplier, while the MNE gets the residual
SMNE = S − SS . β ∈ (0, 1) is the bargaining power of the supplier. If the two
firms are unable to agree, they walk away with whatever is their outside option.
The outside options or fallback positions are FS and FMNE. The general solution
to the bargaining problem is
SS = β(S − FMNE) + (1− β)FS (8)
SMNE = (1− β)S + βFMNE − (1− β)FS . (9)
Anticipating the bargaining outcome, the supplier decides how much to produce
given the technology transfer it has received from the MNE
Max
x
ΠS = β(S(x)− FMNE) + (1− β)FS(x)− 1
TO
x
Since the fallback of the MNE will depend on whether it can get inputs from
somewhere else, FMNE is independent of the supplier’s decision. The supplier’s
own fallback will depend on how much inputs it has produced, since the fallback
will depend on whether or not it can sell the inputs to someone else. So in general,
the first order condition for the supplier is
β
∂S
∂x
+ (1− β)∂F
S
∂x
=
1
TO
. (10)
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It states the familiar result that marginal income be equated to marginal costs.
Marginal income in (10) comes from two sources. By producing more inputs the
supplier increases its income through the first term because surplus increases, while
the second term comes from an improvement in its own fallback that increases the
share of the surplus going to the supplier.
Moving backwards to the first stage in the sequence of decisions, the decision
problem of the MNE is how much technology to transfer to its outsourcing partner,
given what it expects the supplier to produce and how they will share the resulting
surplus.
Max
TO
ΠMNEO = (1− β)S (TO) + βFMNE (TO)− (1− β)FS (TO)− T 2O
In general, both fallback positions depend on the MNE’s choice of investment. So
the general first order condition for the MNE is
(1− β) ∂S
∂TO
+ β
∂FMNE
∂TO
= 2TO + (1− β)
∂FS
∂TO
(11)
On the left hand side of (11), the marginal benefits of increased technology transfer
come from its contribution to both the surplus and the fallback of the MNE. The
marginal costs on the right hand side of (11) consist of the direct cost of technology
transfer and an indirect cost through the possible eﬀect better technology in input
production has on the fallback of the supplier.
Now consider more closely the fallbacks of our two firms. The fallback of
the supplier will depend on whether an alternative buyer for the inputs exists.
With no alternative final good producer that can make use of the specific input,
the supplier’s fallback is zero. The MNE can get the input from its home plant
if negotiations with the supplier break down, so the fallback is the profit from
vertical FDI in (3).
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The main role played by the possibility of technological spillovers in this model
is that spillovers generate threat of entry by new firms. A potential new supplier
will change the MNE’s fallback in its negotiations with the incumbent supplier.
From the general first order conditions of the supplier and the MNE in (10) and
(11) it is clear that the fallback positions will influence the decisions of the two
firms and the resulting profits each firm can get with an incomplete outsourcing
contract.
I discuss outsourcing without spillovers as case A, while outsourcing with
spillovers is denoted case B. The variables that diﬀer between the two cases have
subscripts A and B.
3.4.1. Case A: No technology spillovers
If the two firms are unable to reach an agreement on how to split the surplus,
the supplier has no alternative buyer of the produced input and its fallback is zero
FS = 0. (12)
The MNE can get inputs from its home plant if no agreement is reached with the
outsourcing partner. This alternative way of getting inputs to its assembly plant
determines the fallback as equal to operating profits from vertical FDI in (3)
FMNEA = πV . (13)
The first order conditions, (10) and (11), from the profit maximization problem
of the two firms are now
β
dS
dx
=
1
TOA
(14)
(1− β) ∂S
∂TOA
= 2TOA . (15)
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Insert surplus from equation (7) into (14) to get the production of inputs
xA =
1
4
Aβ2T 2OA . (16)
The MNE expects this output level and the optimal level of technology transfer
that follows from (15) is
TOA =



1
4 (1− β)Aβ if A <
4
(1−β)β
1 if A ≥ 4(1−β)β .
(17)
(17) states that when the market is relatively small or the bargaining power of
the supplier is either very small or very large, there will be less than full technology
transfer. With small β the supplier has little incentives to produce inputs, and
this makes the MNE reluctant to incur high costs of technology transfer. With
large bargaining power, even if the supplier produces more inputs, the MNE is still
reluctant to transfer technology because it gets a very small share of the surplus
generated.
To find the profit levels of the two firms insert the optimal quantity (16) into
the surplus expression (7), and use this together with the fallbacks (12) and (13)
in( 8) and (9) to find the shares of the surplus going to each firm. The resulting
profit levels are then
ΠMNEOA =



T 2OA + βπV − I if TOA < 1
(1− β) 12Aβ − 1 + βπV − I if TOA = 1
(18)
ΠSA =



1
4Aβ
2TOA − βπV if TOA < 1
1
4Aβ
2 − βπV if TOA = 1.
(19)
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3.4.2. Case B: Spillovers generate threat of entry
Technological spillovers now make it possible for a new supplier to produce the
inputs required by the MNE. When bargaining with the incumbent supplier the
MNE will be better oﬀ. The reason is that the MNE can turn to the new supplier
if negotiations with the incumbent break down. If spillovers are not perfect, the
new supplier has somewhat higher costs than the incumbent (γ/TO > 1/TO), but
in the following I assume perfect spillovers. The incumbent supplier has still no
alternative buyer for its inputs, so falllback is unchanged from case A.
The fallback of the MNE in its negotiations with the incumbent supplier is
now defined as the share of the surplus it can get when bargaining with the new
supplier. In the potential second round bargaining with the new supplier, fallbacks
are the same as in case A; zero for the new supplier and profits from vertical FDI
for the MNE. Since the second round bargaining has the same structure as in case
A, the new supplier faces the same trade-oﬀ as the incumbent supplier did in
case A. I assume the potential new supplier has the same bargaining power as the
incumbent supplier. The resulting share for the MNE will be the same as in case
A and is given by (9). This share now defines the fallback for the MNE in the
bargaining with the incumbent supplier
FMNEB = (1− β)
1
2
AβTOB + βπV . (20)
For (20) to be the relevant fallback for the MNE, it must be the case that it
is better than the fallback without threat of entry of a new supplier (13). This
implies βTOB >
1
2τV .
The incumbent supplier faces the same tradeoﬀ as without threat of entry of
a new supplier, and will produce the same as without spillovers for a given level
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of technology transfer
xB =
1
4
Aβ2T 2OB . (21)
Since the technology transfer decision aﬀects marginal costs of both the in-
cumbent and the new supplier, the MNE faces a new tradeoﬀ when making its
technology transfer decision. The MNE decides on how much technology to trans-
fer given what it knows the outsourcing supplier will produce and what a new
supplier will produce if the incumbents cannot agree. The first order condition in
equation (11) is now
(1− β) ∂S
∂TOB
+ β
∂FMNEB
∂TOB
= 2TOB (22)
Use equations (7), (20) and (21) in the first order condition to solve for the optimal
level of technology transfer
TOB =



1
4Aβ(1− β
2) if A < 4β(1−β2)
1 if A ≥ 4β(1−β2) .
(23)
Comparing equations (17) and (23) we see that technology transfer is higher with
spillovers than without: TOB = TOA(1 + β). The MNE will give full technology
transfer at a smaller market size with spillovers than without. The reason is that
transferring better technology to the outsourcing partner also lowers the costs
of the firm that benefits from spillovers. Lower costs for the potential entrant
improves the MNE’s fallback in its negotiations with the incumbent, and gives the
MNE a larger share of the surplus.
By the same approach as in case A, the profit levels with spillovers are
ΠMNEOB =



T 2oB + β
2πV − I if ToB < 1
1
2Aβ(1− β)(1 + β) + β
2πV − 1− I if ToB = 1
(24)
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ΠSB =



1
4β
2ATOB (2β − 1)− β2πV if ToB < 1
1
4β
2A(2β − 1)− β2πV if ToB = 1.
(25)
3.5. Outsourcing with complete contracts
In order to illustrate the eﬀect of the contracting environment on the profits
from outsourcing, assume that the two firms are able to sign an eﬃcient out-
sourcing contract. Our interpretation of complete contracts here is that before
technology transfer, the two firms bargain over how to share the surplus net of
technology transfer and input production costs. Thereafter technology transfer
and input production take place. We use the same general Nash-bargaining solu-
tion as with incomplete contracts and no spillovers. So the MNE has a positive
fallback equal to πV in equation (3). With complete and binding contracts the
possibility of spillovers will not aﬀect the bargaining result or the decisions of the
two firms. The supplier’s problem is maxΠS(x) = β
³√
Ax− 1T x− T
2 − πV
´
,
which results in the following input production x = 14AT
2. The share for MNE
is (1 − β)
³√
Ax− 1T x− T 2
´
+ βπV which leads to T = A8 , which means there
will be full technology transfer when A > 8. Compared to the level of technology
transfer under incomplete contracts in both (17) and (23), it is clear that with
complete contracts it takes a smaller market to give incentives to full technology
transfer than under incomplete contracts. The hold-up problem that aﬀects both
the MNE’s technology transfer decision and the supplier’s production decision is
eliminated with complete contracts. The resulting profit functions are
ΠMNE =



(1− β)
³
A2
64
´
+ βπV − I if A < 8
(1− β)
¡
1
4A− 1
¢
+ βπV − I if A > 8
(26)
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ΠSupp =



β
³
A2
64 − πV
´
if A < 8
β
¡
1
4A− 1− πV
¢
if A > 8
(27)
4. Mode of entry choice
The MNE chooses how to serve the new market by comparing profit levels
from diﬀerent modes of entry. The mode of entry choice is aﬀected by the value
of the following parameters: market size (A), the costs of investment (I), costs of
transporting final goods and inputs (τE and τV ), the cost disadvantage of internal
production(τH), and the bargaining power of the supplier (β). In the following I
will show how mode of entry varies with market size and costs of trading inputs
(τV ), with given values of the other parameters.
To find the preferred mode of entry, I calculate isoprofit curves for each mode
of entry pair. Four possible modes of entry give rise to six diﬀerent isoprofit
curves. With outsourcing it is not enough to consider how the profits of the MNE
compare to the other modes of entry. It is also important to check whether the
supplier would want to produce inputs for the MNE under the conditions dictated
by the outsourcing contract. We assume that the supplier declines an outsourcing
contract unless it expects non-negative profits from producing inputs. The gen-
eral expressions for the diﬀerent isoprofit curves and participation constraints are
derived in appendix B.
Sections 4.1-4.4 illustrate how the isoprofit-curves combine to determine the
MNE’s mode of entry choice. The isoprofit curves are drawn in the AτV -plane
for given values of the other parameters. In section 4.1, I start with two general
cases while ignoring the possibility of outsourcing. In sections 4.2-4.4, I consider
all four modes of entry and show the MNE’s mode of entry choice for the three
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diﬀerent outsourcing cases: 4.2) outsourcing with incomplete contracts and no
spillovers, 4.3) outsourcing with incomplete contracts and vertical spillovers, and
4.4) outsourcing with complete contracts.
4.1. Mode of entry without outsourcing
The relevant isoprofit curves from appendix B are now the exporting-versus-
vertical FDI-curve (EV-curve) in (28), the EH-curve (29), and the HV-curve (30).
The first letter in the names of the isoprofit curves corresponds to the mode of
entry preferred to the left of the curve (or below the curve in the case of horizontal
isoprofit curves).
When comparing profits from exporting in (2) to profits from horizontal FDI
in (6), note that if τH ≤ τE exporting will always dominate horizontal FDI. When
τH ≤ τE, integrated internal production in the new market is costly relative to
exporting to the new market from the home plant. For short, I call this first general
case costly integration. Under costly integration the isoprofit curves including
mode H become irrelevant. When E, V, and H are the possible modes of entry,
the only relevant isoprofit curve is the EV-curve in the upper panel of figure 1.
Here, and in all later figures, I use the following parameter values in the costly
integration case: τH ≤ τE, τE = 12 , I = 1. The EV-curve has the level of trade
costs for final goods, τE, as its vertical asymptote (not drawn in the figure). When
τV < τE, the loss from exporting inputs is larger than from exporting the final
good, and vertical FDI would never be better for the MNE than exporting the
final good.
By contrast, the second general case is called eﬃcient integration. If τH > τE
internal production of inputs in the new market is relatively eﬃcient compared
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to exporting. For the eﬃcient integration case I only increase the eﬃciency of
internal production and keep the other parameters equal to the costly integration
case: τH = 34 , τE =
1
2 , I = 1. The three isoprofit curves are shown in the lower
left panel of figure 1. As long as τH > τE the three curves will intersect as shown
in the figure. The point in the AτV -plane where intersection occurs will of course
depend on the parameter values. The HV-curve has τH as its vertical asymptote.
When τV > τH the ineﬃciency from internal production is larger than the loss
from exporting inputs, and vertical FDI is preferred to horizontal FDI. The lower
right panel of figure 1 shows the same isoprofit curves as in the left panel. To focus
on the mode of entry choice, I have removed the parts of the curves that become
irrelevant when comparing profit levels from all three modes of entry.
4.2. Outsourcing with incomplete contracts and no spillovers
With outsourcing as a possible mode of entry in addition to E, V, and H,
all six isoprofit curves must be considered. The new parameter of interest when
introducing outsourcing is the bargaining power of the supplier in the outsourcing
negotiations with the MNE. For each of the two general cases; costly integration
and eﬃcient integration, I will show the mode of entry choice for two values of
bargaining power. As in the right panel of figure 2, I show only the undominated
parts of the relevant isoprofit curves.
Costly integration Since horizontal FDI is dominated by exporting when inte-
grated production is costly relative to exporting, the relevant isoprofit curves are
the combined participation constraint and OV-curve (31), the EV-curve (28), and
the EO-curve (32). The upper panel of figure 2 shows the mode of entry choice
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for β = 12 and for β =
2
3 . Since the supplier is better oﬀ with larger bargaining
power it is willing to accept the outsourcing contract for larger values of input
trade costs (τV ) . In addition, the improved incentives for the supplier from larger
bargaining power makes it produce more inputs. The MNE gets a smaller share
of a larger surplus, but profits increase because the surplus-eﬀect dominates.
Eﬃcient integration As the costs of internal production fall, horizontal FDI
also becomes a possible choice for the MNE. We must now consider all 6 isoprofit-
curves (28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33). The lower part of figure 2 shows the mode of entry
choice for β = 12 and for β =
2
3 . From the figure we see that outsourcing is not
chosen when β = 12 . When internal production of inputs in the new market is rel-
atively eﬃcient (τH = 34), horizontal FDI dominates outsourcing with incomplete
contracts. The ineﬃciency arising from the hold-up problem under outsourcing
is worse than that coming from internal cost disadvantages. As the bargaining
power of the supplier increases, the hold-up problem is reduced and this also in-
creases the MNE’s profits from outsourcing. When β = 23 , outsourcing is chosen
for intermediate values of input trade costs. If τ V˙ gets larger than
2
3 the fallback
of the MNE in the outsourcing negotiations is so large that the supplier expects
negative profits and declines the contract. For τ V˙ smaller than
11
24 , the fallback
for the MNE is so low that it prefers horizontal FDI.
4.3. Outsourcing with incomplete contracts and vertical spillovers
Costly integration The relevant isoprofit curves shown in the upper part of
figure 3 are the EV-curve (28), the combined participation constraint and OV-
curve (34), and the EO-curve (35). From the participation constraint it is clear
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that with β = 12 it will not be possible for the MNE to outsource production of
the input. Even if spillovers increase MNE profits by improving its fallback, this
results in such a low share for the supplier that it can’t cover its input production
costs when β = 12 . The MNE will not be able to outsource at all, unless it can
commit itself not to exploiting the fact that there are spillovers. With more than
half the bargaining power the supplier may accept an outsourcing contract, but
the possible outsourcing area is clearly smaller than when there are no spillovers
due to a tighter participation constraint.
Eﬃcient integration In addition to the isoprofit curves from the costly inte-
gration case, we must also consider the EH-curve (29), the HV-curve (30), and the
HO-curve (36). The mode of entry choice is shown in the lower part of figure 5.
Note the diﬀerence between the outsourcing area when β = 23 under costly and
eﬃcient integration. Since profits from horizontal FDI are larger in the lower part
of figure 3, the MNE would prefer horizontal FDI to outsourcing if input trade
costs are very large (here τV < 148 ). Large input trade costs give the MNE a small
fallback in the outsourcing negotiations and thus lower profits from outsourcing.
4.4. Outsourcing with complete contracts
Costly integration Figure 4 shows the preferred modes of entry when outsourc-
ing contracts are complete. The relevant isoprofit curves when integration is costly
are the EV-curve (28), the combined participation constraint and OV-curve (37),
and the EO-curve (38). There are two important diﬀerences to the similar case
with incomplete contracts (figures 2 and 3). With complete contracts the outsourc-
ing area is larger than with incomplete contracts, the reason is that eliminating
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the hold-up problem increases eﬃciency and thus profits from outsourcing. The
second diﬀerence is that with complete contracts, the outsourcing area decreases
when the bargaining power of the supplier increases from 12 to
2
3 , while the op-
posite is the case under incomplete contracts. The reason is that under complete
contracts, input production is the same regardless of β, thus the surplus is the
same but the MNE gets less of it when the supplier has higher bargaining power.
Naturally, the MNE will be less interested in outsourcing. Under incomplete con-
tracts, the surplus increases because the supplier faces better incentives, and this
eﬀect dominates the fact that the MNE gets a smaller share of the surplus.
Eﬃcient integration In addition to the isoprofit curves from the costly inte-
gration case, we must also consider the EH-curve (29), the HV-curve (30), and the
HO-curve (39). The mode of entry picture is shown in the lower part of figure 4.
Again note the diﬀerence to the similar cases with incomplete contracts (figure 2
and 3). With complete contracts outsourcing is possible also when β = 12 , while
with incomplete contracts outsourcing is dominated by the other modes of entry.
The reason is the same as in the costly integration case: profits from outsourc-
ing with complete contracts are larger than with incomplete contracts because
the hold-up problem is eliminated. When β = 23 , the MNE is less interested in
outsourcing since it gets a smaller share of the same surplus.
5. Conclusion
When multinationals consider how to enter a foreign market, their decision
might be aﬀected by how their technology may spill over to other firms under
diﬀerent modes of entry. The mode of entry versus spillover tradeoﬀ has typically
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been considered in models of horizontal FDI where competitors (new or existing)
of the MNE acquire the knowledge of how to produce the MNE’s product. The
possibility of such ex-post competition may induce the MNE to export their prod-
uct, rather than to establish a subsidiary in the foreign market. This paper departs
from the horizontal spillover assumption and considers how the MNE’s mode of
entry choice is aﬀected by vertical spillovers of intermediate input technology.
I have presented a model where the MNE chooses between four diﬀerent modes
of entry. Spillovers occur only under the outsourcing mode where the MNE es-
tablishes a subsidiary for assembly of the final good and outsources intermediate
input production to a host country firm. Spillovers in this case generate threat
of entry of a new supplier for the MNE. Outsourcing contracts are assumed to
be incomplete. Since both the supplier and the MNE make relation-specific in-
vestments (input production and technology transfer), outsourcing suﬀers from a
double hold-up problem. Threat of entry works as an improvement in the bar-
gaining position of the MNE in the outsourcing negotiations with the incumbent
supplier. If knowlegde of how to produce the input spreads to another firm, the
MNE can threaten the incumbent supplier with getting inputs from the potential
entrant, and thus get a larger share of the surplus generated from getting the in-
puts from the incumbent. Thus, MNE profits from outsourcing are higher with
spillovers than without.
Despite the fact that vertical spillovers improve outsourcing profits for the
MNE, the MNE will in many cases be unable to reap these benefits because it will
have diﬃculties in finding an outsourcing partner if the local firm expects spillovers
to take place. Unless the MNE can commit itself not to exploit an increase in
competition upstream, potential outsourcing partners may decline an incomplete
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outsourcing contract. It is also the case that MNE profits from outsourcing will
be higher when the supplier expects to get two thirds of the surplus than when the
two firms share 50-50. The reason is that the eﬀect from improved incentives to
produce inputs dominates the fact that the MNE gets a lower share of the surplus.
The results when assuming incomplete outsourcing contracts are compared to
a situation where the two firms are able to write complete, binding and eﬃcient
outsourcing contracts. In this setting spillovers have no eﬀect, since the MNE by
definition is unable to exploit an increase in upstream competition. With complete
contracts the outsourcing area is larger than with incomplete contracts, the reason
is that eliminating the hold-up problem increases eﬃciency and thus profits from
outsourcing. MNE profits from outsourcing are lower when the supplier gets two
thirds of the surplus than when the two firms share 50-50. The reason is that
under complete contracts, input production is the same regardless of the sharing
rule.
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Notes
1The export versus FDI tradeoﬀ with horizontal spillovers is modelled in Fos-
furi, Motta and Rønde (2001), Glass and Saggi (2002), Markusen (2001), Petit and
Sanna-Randaccio (2000) and Siotis (1999). See Markusen (1995) for a discussion
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of the licensing versus FDI tradeoﬀ .
2The authors suggest that problems with data and methodology are possible
reasons for the lack of evidence for positive spillovers. See also Görg and Strobl
(2001). For an earlier survey of spillovers from FDI, see Blomström and Kokko
(1994).
3There is little empirical work testing whether mode of entry aﬀects the extent
of spillovers to host country firms. Dimelis and Louri (2002) find in a study from
Greece that spillovers from minority owned foreign firms are larger than from
majority owned firms, while Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) find that the degree
of foreign ownership does not aﬀect the extent of spillovers in Indonesia.
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Sequence of decisions under diﬀerent entry modes.
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A Derivation of isoprofit curves
A1. Exporting versus vertical FDI
Compare profits from exporting to profits from vertical FDI in equations (2)
and (4). The isoprofit curve is given by
A =
4I
τV − τE
, (28)
where ΠE > ΠV to the left of the EV-curve in (28).
A2. Exporting versus horizontal FDI
When comparing profits from exporting (2) with profits from horizontal FDI (6)
we must consider both the case where the market is too small to give full technology
transfer under horizontal FDI (A < 8τH ) and the full technology transfer case. As
noted before, if τH < τE exporting is always preferred to horizontal FDI. I assume
that the cost of full technology transfer for input production is smaller than the
fixed cost of investment in the assembly plant. As I have normalized the cost of full
technology transfer to 1, the resulting restriction on I is I ≥ 1. When τH > τE ,
the assumption that I ≥ 1 ensures that exporting dominates horizontal FDI when
A < 8τH . We are left with the following isoprofit curve when τH > τE and A ≥
8
τH
A =
4 (1 + I)
τH − τE
. (29)
The EH-curve in (29) is a horizontal line in the A− τV -plane where exporting is
preferred below the curve.
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A3. Horizontal versus vertical FDI
From the derivation of the EH-curve we know that exporting dominates hori-
zontal FDI when A < 8τH . Thus, we only need to compare profits under horizontal
FDI (6) and vertical FDI (4) when A ≥ 8τH . The isoprofit curve is
A =
4
τH − τV
, (30)
where horizontal FDI is preferred to vertical FDI above and to the left of the
HV-curve in (30).
A4. Outsourcing with incomplete contracts and no spillovers
A4.1. Participation constraint
The supplier will only accept an outsourcing contract if it expects non-negative
profits. From (19) we find that the participation constraint holds if A ≥ 4 τVβ2(1−β)
when the market is too small for full technology transfer, and for β ≥ τV otherwise.
A4.2. Outsourcing versus vertical FDI
Compare profits from outsourcing in (18) to profits from vertical FDI in (4) to
find that outsourcing is preferred to vertical FDI whenever the participation con-
straint for the supplier holds. The MNE would prefer outsourcing to vertical FDI
also for other parameter values, but is constrained by the participation constraint.
The feasible OV-curve equals the participation constraint:



A = 4 τVβ2(1−β) if A <
4
β(1−β)
β > τV if A ≥ 4β(1−β) .
(31)
Outsourcing is preferred to the left of the OV-curve defined by (31).
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A4.3. Outsourcing versus exporting
Profits from outsourcing (18) with less than full technology transfer is larger
than profits from exporting (2) when
¡
1
4Aβ(1− β)
¢2
+ β 14AτV −
1
4AτE − I > 0.
The solution to this inequality is of the form A ∈ (−∞, a1) ∪ (a2,∞), where
0 < a1, a2 <
4
β(1−β) , and
a1 =
2
β2 (1− β)2
µ
− (βτV − τE)−
q
(βτV − τE)2 + 4β2 (1− β)2 I
¶
a2 =
2
β2 (1− β)2
µ
− (βτV − τE) +
q
(βτV − τE)2 + 4β2 (1− β)2 I
¶
It turns out that a1 > 0 implies βτV < τE , while a1 < 4β(1−β) implies βτV > τE .
This contradiction eliminates a1, and we are left with A = a2 as the isoprofit curve
when A < 4β(1−β) . The second part of the EO-curve is defined where the market
is large enough to give full technology transfer under outsourcing. In sum, the
EO-curve is:



A = a2,βτV > τE if A < 4β(1−β)
A = 4 1+I
2β−2β2+βτV−τE if A ≥
4
β(1−β) .
(32)
where outsourcing is preferred to exporting above and to the right of the EO-curve.
A4.4. Outsourcing versus horizontal FDI
From the isoprofit condition in (29) we have that horizontal FDI will not be
preferred over exporting before the market has a certain size; A > 4 1+IτH−τE . It is
only relevant to compare profits from outsourcing to profits from horizontal FDI
above this market threshold.
Two possibilities must be considered. The first is that even though A >
4 1+IτH−τE , the market is not large enough to give full technology transfer under
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outsourcing, i.e. 4 1+IτH−τE < A <
4
β(1−β) . Then profits from outsourcing are larger
than horizontal FDI if
¡
1
4Aβ(1− β)
¢2
+ β 14AτV −
1
4AτH +1 > 0. The solution to
this inequality is of the form A ∈ (−∞, a1) ∪ (a2,∞), where 0 < a1, a2 < 4β(1−β) ,
and
a1 =
2
β2 (1− β)2
µ
− (βτV − τH)−
q
(βτV − τH)2 − 4β2 (1− β)2
¶
a2 =
2
β2 (1− β)2
µ
− (βτV − τH) +
q
(βτV − τH)2 − 4β2 (1− β)2
¶
.
It turns out that requiring both a1 and a2 < 4β(1−β) implies 4β
2 (1− β)2 >
(βτV − τH)2 , which does not ensure that a1 and a2 are real numbers. The con-
clusion is that outsourcing can never be better than horizontal FDI if the market
is too small for full technology transfer under outsourcing, but big enough for full
technology transfer with horizontal FDI.
The second possibility to consider is when the market is large enough to give
full technology transfer under outsourcing. Then A > 4 1+IτH−τE and A ≥
4
β(1−β) .
The isoprofit curve is then
τV =
τH − 2β(1− β)
β
(33)
The HO-curve is a vertical line in the A−τV -plane. Horizontal FDI is preferred
to the left of the line, when τV is smaller than the condition in (33). The reason
is that the MNE’s fallback in the outsourcing negotiations is so small that profits
from horizontal FDI are larger than for outsourcing. As input trade costs fall (τV
increases) profits from outsourcing increase and when τV becomes larger than in
(33) the MNE prefers outsourcing to horizontal FDI.
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A5. Outsourcing with incomplete contracts and vertical spillovers
A5.1. Participation constraint
From supplier profits in (25) we find that the participation constraint holds
if A ≥ 4τVβ(1−β2)(2β−1) when there is less than full technology transfer, while the
requirement is β > 12 , and τV < (2β − 1) otherwise. The supplier needs larger
bargaining power to accept an outsourcing contract when there are spillovers that
generate threat of entry than without spillovers.
A5.2. Outsourcing versus vertical FDI
Compare profits from outsourcing in (24) to profits from vertical FDI in (4) to
find that outsourcing is preferred to vertical FDI whenever the participation con-
straint for the supplier holds. The MNE would prefer outsourcing to vertical FDI
also for other parameter values, but is constrained by the participation constraint.
The feasible OV-curve equals the participation constraint:



A = 4τVβ(1−β2)(2β−1) if A <
4
β(1−β2)
β > 12 , τV < (2β − 1) if A ≥
4
β(1−β2) .
(34)
Outsourcing is preferred to the left of the OV-curve defined by (34).
A5.3. Outsourcing versus exporting
Profits from outsourcing (24) with less than full technology transfer are larger
than profits from exporting (2) when
¡
1
4Aβ(1− β
2)
¢2
+β2 14AτV −
1
4AτE − I > 0.
Note the similarity to the same comparison without spillovers. The solution to this
inequality is also of the form A ∈ (−∞, b1) ∪ (b2,∞), where 0 < b1, b2 < 4β(1−β2) .
The same structure of argument as in the no-spillover case can be applied. The
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resulting isoprofit curve is



A = b2,β
2τV > τE if A < 4β(1−β2)
A = 4(1+I)
2β(1−β2)−τE+β2τV if A ≥
4
β(1−β2) ,
(35)
where outsourcing is preferred to exporting above and to the right of the EO-curve
defined in (35), and
b2 =
2
β2
¡
1− β2
¢2 µ− ¡β2τV − τE¢+q¡β2τV − τE¢2 + 4β2 ¡1− β2¢2 I¶ .
A5.4. Outsourcing versus horizontal FDI
We can use exactly the same type of argument as in the no spillover case to find
the isoprofit curve with spillovers. The result is similar: outsourcing can never be
better than horizontal FDI if the market is too small for full technology transfer
under outsourcing, but big enough for full technology transfer with horizontal FDI.
When A > 4 1+IτH−τE and A >
4
β(1−β2) , the isoprofit curve is
τV =
τH − 2β(1− β2)
β2
. (36)
As in the no spillover case, the HO-curve is a vertical line in the A−τV -plane, and
horizontal FDI is preferred to outsourcing when τV is smaller than the condition
in (36).
A6. Outsourcing with complete contracts
A6.1. Participation constraint
Requiring supplier profits in (27) to be non-negative requires A > 16τV when
A < 8, and A > 41−τV otherwise.
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A6.2. Outsourcing versus vertical FDI
The MNE compares profits from outsourcing with complete contracts in (26)
to profits from vertical FDI in (4). The isoprofit curve turns out to be the same
as the participation constraint



A = 16τV for A < 8
A = 41−τV for A ≥ 8.
(37)
Outsourcing is preferred to vertical FDI above the OV-curve defined in (37).
A6.3. Outsourcing versus exporting
When A < 8 profits from outsourcing in (26) are larger than profits from
exports if (1− β)A264 + βπV − I −
1
4AτE > 0.The solution to this inequality is of
the form A ∈ (−∞, d1) ∪ (d2,∞), where 0 < d1, d2 < 8 , and
d1 =
8
(1− β)
³
−(βτV − τE)−
p
(βτV − τE)2 + (1− β)I
´
d2 =
8
(1− β)
³
−(βτV − τE) +
p
(βτV − τE)2 + (1− β)I
´
.
It turns out that d1 > 0 is impossible, and this eliminates d1 as a relevant solution.
In order for d2 < 8 we get the condition that 1 ≤ I < (1− β) + 2(βτV − τE). We
end up with the following isoprofit curve:



A = d2, 1 ≤ I < (1− β) + 2(βτV − τE) if A < 8
A = 4(1−β+I)1−β−τE+βτV if A ≥ 8.
(38)
Outsourcing is preferred to exporting above the EO-curve in (38).
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A6.4. Outsourcing versus horizontal FDI
As in the incomplete contracting cases, it is not of any interest to compare
outsourcing profits to horizontal FDI unless H is preferred over exporting, which
again means A > 4 1+IτH−τE >
8
τH
. Since 8τH > 8, we also know that when the
market is this big there is full technology transfer with outsourcing. The relevant
isoprofit curve is then



τV =
τH−(1−β)
β if 1− β − τH + βτV > 0
A = −4β1−β−τH+βτV if 1− β − τH + βτV < 0.
(39)
Outsourcing is preferred to horizontal FDI when τV is larger than the first
condition in (39), or outsourcing is preferred to horizontal FDI below the curve
from the second condition.
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